

Routes to tour in Germany

The Harz and Heath Route



German roads will get you there — to areas at times so attractive that one route leads to the next, from the Harz mountains to the Lüneburg Heath, say. Maybe you should take a look at both. The Harz, northernmost part of the Mittelgebirge range, is holiday country all the year round. In summer for hikers, in winter for skiers in their tens of thousands. Tour from the hill resorts of Osterode, Clausthal-Zellerfeld or Bad Harzburg or from the 1,000-


year-old town of Goslar. The Heath extends from Celle, with its town centre of half-timbered houses unscathed by the war and the oldest theatre in Germany, to Lüneburg, also 1,000 years old. It boasts wide expanses of flat countryside, purple heather and herds of local curly-horned sheep.

Visit Germany and let the Harz and Heath Route be your guide.



- 1 Brunswick
- 2 An old Lüneburg Heath farmhouse
- 3 The Harz
- 4 Göttingen

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Worried Germans hold key to Nato unity

Bonn the sick man of the Atlantic alliance, weakened by exposure to the radiation of President Reagan's and Defence Secretary Weinberger's rhetoric and stupefied by the drug of peace offered by Mr Andropov?

Will this be the year in which the cohesion of Nato is decided "in the Germans' minds," as Bonn Defence Minister Manfred Wörner puts it? This view seemed to predominate in the minds of politicians, diplomats and military experts in Munich for the 20th *Wirkungstagung*, or defence studies congress.

Egon Bahr, as a leading Social Democratic speaker, did little to dispel their fears. Not surprisingly, the election campaign made its mark on the Munich meeting.

The issue at stake was, as ever, the future of the Atlantic alliance, which will be in the dark as long as no solution has been found to the current crisis.

There are too many points on which the countries are either not clear or at odds. They include the outcome of the Geneva Euro-missile talks and the credibility of Nato's flexible response strategy.

Can the nuclear threshold be hoisted higher? Is the cash available for the strengthening of conventional armed forces that is needed?

In what circumstances might Europe be able to decouple from America and fight a greater right to a European say? Nato decisions consolidate the North Atlantic pact and make missile modernisation more palatable?

There were many answers to these questions, the last of which was posed by Bundeswehr General Gerd Schmücking (left).

As in the past, there were clear differences of opinion between Germans and Americans. This state of affairs has changed little since the change of government in Bonn.

German worries are not just triggered by the US arms industry's protectionism. Franz Josef Strauss, the Bavarian Minister, and Alois Mertes, Minister of State at the Bonn Foreign Office, made the same point from different angles.

Both are worried by the effect US helicopter may have on German public opinion.

Herr Strauss would like to see missile modernisation relieved of its dependence on the Geneva talks.

He grandly dismissed the zero option as absurd even though Defence Minister Wörner and US speakers upheld it, at least pro forma.

The CSU leader feels the German public, which most people present felt was at stake, can be taken by storm. Mertes is more cautious and usually more realistically.

He called on the Americans not to further exacerbate German anxieties by

stepping up public discussion of worst conceivable cases.

Both men's worries sounded exaggerated inasmuch as the zero option has already been dropped from the Geneva conference agenda.

This was confirmed by no less an authority than the chief US negotiator, Paul Nitze. But specific US proposals requested by a number of conservative participants look like having to wait until after the German general election.

Much though the Americans might like to lend the CDU/CSU a helping hand, they are also worried proposals might be flogged to death in the election campaign, merely whetting the appetite for further concessions.

They felt able to infer from what Social Democrat Egon Bahr had to say that their fears were not entirely unfounded.

Herr Bahr is indeed a formidable one-man deterrent with his talent for ambiguous and indeterminate comments.

He said he had personal doubts whether what might emerge from the Geneva talks would be feasible, given the resistance to missile modernisation that might be expected.

He wondered whether the stability of the Federal Republic and Nato was not to be ruled more highly than the introduction of a new weapons system.

This left US listeners wondering whether Herr Bahr had inwardly already parted company with the Nato dual-track resolution or merely sought, by painting threatening pictures of an alarming confrontation between Bonn and Washington, to persuade the United States to make further concessions.

Both options are equally unpleasant from the US point of view, but as he is opposed to an interim solution which would whatever happened mean partial missile modernisation, he must be assumed at least to be aiming at a postponement of the stationing deadline.

Herr Bahr may be too anxious in his view of the part of German public opinion that is opposed to missile modernisation.

But those who simply make the media out to be to blame for the Germans' nuclear worries take too easy a view of the position.

Americans in particular find it hard to appreciate that by flaunting worst case talk in a bid to get the US arms

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Kohl meets Afghans

Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl (right) meeting a group of Afghan resistance leaders in Strasbourg at the invitation of the European Assembly. Herr Kohl was in Strasbourg to address Euro-MPs.

Photo: dpa

Missile debate leaves voters mystified

The German general election campaign has breathed fresh life into the debate within the Western alliance on Washington's attitude at the Geneva arms control talks with Moscow.

The connection was indirectly confirmed by US Vice-President George Bush's tour of Europe.

Yet German election campaigners out on the hustings have created more confusion than clarity among voters with their missile talk.

Chancellor Kohl sees his salvation in retaining the so-called double zero option, the renunciation by both sides of all land-based medium-range missiles proposed by President Reagan at the behest of the old Bonn government.

Russia has so far rejected the idea out of hand, noting that Britain, France and China (and not just it and America) are nuclear powers.

So the Bavarian Prime Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, feels the double zero option is unrealistic, and he is doubtless right.

Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Free Democratic leader, would not like to rule out an interim solution, as he puts it.

As Foreign Minister he is not yet in a position to declare President Reagan's proposal dead and buried, but at the

same time he well understands Moscow's rejection.

The SPD Shadow Chancellor, Hans-Jochen Vogel, bases his view on the Munich SPD conference resolution to review the situation at the end of the year in the light of progress at the Geneva talks.

Only then, he says, need consideration be given to stationing Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in West Germany, to whether and to what extent.

Herr Vogel says he can imagine a Bonn government led by him vetoing the stationing of new US missiles in Germany even if agreement is not reached at the Geneva talks.

He envisages this possibility if the blame for failure to reach agreement could be laid fairly and squarely on the United States for not being ready enough to compromise.

All four party leaders, Herr Kohl, Herr Strauss, Herr Genscher and Herr Vogel, face the problem that Nato governments have been incapable of getting across to a wider public the basic idea behind the December 1979 Nato dual-track resolution.

It is that if the West is to persuade the Soviet Union to negotiate any reduction in the number of SS-20 missiles the West has no choice but first to threaten to modernise its own medium-range missile potential.

President Reagan and Defence Secretary Weinberger have fuelled the fires of suspicion that what they had in mind was a fresh arms race.

Yet fundamentally the dual-track resolution seems to have been right. Moscow appears prepared to scrap some of its SS-20s if Washington agrees at the talks not to station Pershing 2s in Western

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■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Slow progress at Madrid annoys neutrals

Neutral countries have of late grown perceptibly more impatient with the course of the Helsinki review conference in Madrid.

Diplomats from Europe's neutral and non-aligned countries spent two days in conference in Berno at the beginning of February to discuss further moves.

They included traditional neutrals such as Austria, Switzerland and Sweden and non-aligned countries large and small.

The larger ones, by European standards, are Yugoslavia, Finland and Ireland. The small fry include Cyprus, Malta and Iceland.

All are keen to arrive at a common platform they can advocate to rank alongside those of Nato and the Warsaw Pact.

Their main concern is to be represented and to put the Madrid conference to good use in the interest of their non-aligned or neutral status.

This requirement is steadily less fulfilled the more the conference is caught in the cleft stick of East-West conflict on its two major issues: human rights and plans for a European disarmament conference.

The European countries, Canada and the United States are now back in session in Madrid in a bid to reach agreement on terms by Easter.

The neutral and non-aligned countries submitted a draft a year ago that would have been backed by Nato members had it not been superseded politically by martial law in Poland.

Thereafter the Western countries were no longer satisfied with its terms, whereas the Soviet Union came increasingly to appreciate the draft as the lesser of two evils.

In the autumn session the Western countries sought to improve the neutrals' proposals in Madrid.

They did so in view of experience in Poland, the growing restrictions imposed by the East Bloc countries on reuniting families, the persecution and dissolution of groups set up in Eastern Europe to monitor progress on the Helsinki accords and the disconnection of direct-dialling telephone services with the Soviet Union.

The West is keen to incorporate more specific terms to protect the free activity of trade unions and Helsinki groups, economic and cultural self-determination for all nations, freedom of belief and to end jamming of broadcasts to the Eastern Bloc.

The now Soviet chief delegate, Mr Kovalev, bore the accusations levelled at Moscow by Western and neutral countries in connection with Soviet policies in Poland and Afghanistan and other breaches of the Helsinki Final Act with much greater equanimity than his easily upset predecessor, Mr Ilyichev.

This difference in temperament and tactics played its part in making the course of the autumn round of talks in Madrid less unruly.

The second major item on the Madrid agenda is drafting a mandate, or catalogue of topics to be discussed at a conference on disarmament in Europe.

The aim is to make further headway on confidence-building measures in the military sector, a number of which, such as advance notice of manoeuvres and

the exchange of manoeuvre observers, were included in the Helsinki accords.

But they are mostly voluntary and in no way binding. Besides, the prior announcement of manoeuvres may be a confidence-building measure; it may also be in Poland's case, be an instrument of intimidation.

The Western countries would like to see a catalogue of measures agreed that make sense, are obligatory and verifiable.

Views still differ on the area they are to cover. The West insists on all Europe; the Soviet Union on the inclusion of an unspecified but substantial area of the Atlantic and its air space.

In June 1981 the West said it was prepared to include adjacent maritime areas, in other words, coastal and adjacent waters, but only in respect of military movements that were subject to notification on land.

That would mean that Reforger exercises by the US forces would be notifiable, whereas US fleet movements in the Atlantic or US troop convoys bound for the Middle East or the Indian Ocean would not.

This distinction must surely indicate a Soviet bid to make a European disarmament conference serve purposes extending beyond Europe.

A European disarmament conference under the Helsinki aegis would inevitably be mixed up with the East-West conflict.

That is why the Western powers want the conference's terms of reference to be as detailed as possible on the area confidence-building measures are to cover so as to rule out trouble over subsequent negotiations.

The Soviet Union would prefer as indeterminate a mandate as possible so as to prejudice nothing.


The neutral and non-aligned countries are increasingly wondering whether they ought to be in favour of a conference at which they would have nothing to give and could expect to get nothing.

They show clearer signs of wanting to bring the Madrid conference to a close; it has dragged on for two years as it is.

Is the Soviet Union playing for time? If it is, the result may be an inconclusive one, as at Belgrade. It could also be the establishment of the Helsinki review conference as a permanent gathering.

That would be an aim on which the Soviet Union has been keen from the start, whereas the West and the neutral countries have from the outset shown no enthusiasm.

Günther Gilleisen
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 5 February 1983)



Former British Premier Edward Heath (left) and SPD leader Willy Brandt present to the Press in Bonn the new Brandt Commission report, Common Crisis. (Photo: dpa)

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Israel owns spectre of a Red and Green majority haunts SPD

The findings and recommendations of the Israeli commission of inquiry into responsibility for the massacre of Palestinian refugees camps last September came as no surprise to SPD leader Willy Brandt.

The verdict bore out the findings of incredible irresponsibility on the part of Israeli civil and military leaders in connection with the massacre.

But the light it shines on the SPD's general secretary Peter Glotz, no means unceremoniously gloating over the enquiry was undertaken against the pressure from the general public.

It is carried out with a will to an absolute majority with the truth without the least whitewashing and reached a verdict that was extremely embarrassing for the Free Democrats.

The SPD leaders are going out of their way to ensure that it remains intact, just a fleshless ghost, trying to keep the Greens below the five per cent mark needed for representation in parliament.

It has remained true to its view of itself and not degenerated into a progressively more visible clique of military men who think solely in military terms.

Where else in the Middle East has such a commission of enquiry been set up and have reached a conclusion?

A number of senior Israeli officers emerge from the enquiry with pybbooks blotted, but a point often forgotten is here worth making.

It was a matter of Israel's shame and moral responsibility of omission and commission, of a total failure to imagine what would happen if Lebanese militia were to be ousted from government.

It was not one of direct and personal guilt for the bloodshed; Israel did the killing.

Israel's leaders have only the world opinion has judged their blame.

The need to forestall such a move was one reason put forward by Israelis for their occupation of the West Bank.

Israel was clearly interested in the militias spread fear and encourage them to leave the Lebanon.

But that is not to say that any risk of massacres of this magnitude was foreseeable.

Asked the traditional question as to whether they would vote if elections were held next Sunday, the answers were:

CDU/CSU 49 per cent;
SPD 42 per cent;
FDP 4 per cent;
Greens 5 per cent.

In terms of seats this would give the CDU/CSU the absolute majority in the Bundestag.

The Mannheim-based Ipsos Institute gave the CDU/CSU only a slight edge over the SPD, which, together with the Greens, would hold the majority in the Bundestag.

CDU/CSU 45.1 per cent;
SPD 44.4 per cent;
FDP 4.8 per cent;
Greens 5.2 per cent.

Only two days earlier, an Emnid poll gave the CDU/CSU 45 per cent, the SPD 42 per cent, the FDP 5 per cent and the Greens also 5 per cent.

This would put the FDP back in the Bundestag, if it were not for the other results.

Institutions leaning towards the present

ment will be tempted to pursue its return to power by any conceivable means, given only half a chance.

Should Shadow Chancellor Hans-Jochen Vogel manage to convert the 42 or 43 per cent pollsters now give him into actual votes he would have achieved a remarkable success.

But satisfaction within the party could soon turn into factionalism and disputes over whether or not to try and come to terms with the Greens.

Wasn't it Brandt who, after the Hesse election, spoke of a majority this side of the conservatives?

And is it not true that the further development of nuclear energy is a hotly disputed issue within the SPD camp?

Doesn't Egon Bahr call for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, not to mention Erhard Eppler and his theories?

The dispute with the SPD would be fierce. After all, the opponents of cooperation or a coalition with the Greens would also have valid arguments to put forward. Is it possible to govern with a majority you can never be sure of?

Have at least the minimum preconditions for cooperation been put on the line: recognition of the parliamentary rules of the game and renunciation of violence to both persons and property?

Hamburg and Hesse cannot be compared with Bonn. Hamburg's Mayor Klaus von Johanyi (SPD) solved his problem of having to rely on the Greens by gaining an absolute majority in a repeat election.

Hesse's Prime Minister Holger Börner, also SPD, will have no choice but to go to the polls again too though his chances of a majority are slim. But it

is his struggle for survival the FDP seems to be living between hope and despair as each successive opinion poll shows the possible outcome of the March election comes in.

The latest poll predicts that the FDP will not make it but that Helmut Kohl will continue to govern with an absolute majority.

This at least is the result arrived at in polls by the Emnid Institute, Bielefeld, and the Hamburg news-magazine *Der Spiegel*.

Even so, all parties try to get guidance from the opinion polls just before an election. They use the results like drunks holding on to a lamp post, not for the light but simply to have something to hang on to.

Moreover, the polls have become a major campaign weapon, as demonstrated by the many posters and stickers. The research institutes, on the other hand, deny that they are being used in this manner.

They more than willingly provide their customers with samplings, for a consideration of course (mostly five-digit amounts).

Survey results have become an indispensable instrument for campaign strategists who use them to manipulate voters, confuse political opponents and encourage their own ranks.

It is not surprising that institutes that sympathise with the SPD give the Free Democrats only three per cent, thus forestalling their end as a Bundestag party.

Institutions leaning towards the present

least bargaining with the Greens has gained him time.

Herr Vogel would be in a much worse position. He would first have to himself elected Chancellor by the Bundestag and once installed he would be hard pressed to get any Bill enacted.

Moreover, constant vetoing by the CDU/CSU majority in the Bundestag would leave him little choice after six months or so but to go to the electorate and ask it to try again.

As a Chancellor who finally had to resign because the Greens played eat and mouse with him and the conservatives denied him any scope of action he would be in a highly unenviable position.

Such prospects make it understandable that the SPD leadership is trying to prevent finding itself in a situation where it would have to struggle with both parts of its own party and the Greens.

This is why the Social Democrats keep repeating their forecast of a two-party Bundestag, hoping that wishing will make it so.

Brandt and Vogel pin more hopes on this coming true than on a formal declaration to the effect that a coalition with the Greens is out of the question for them.

For one, such a statement would weaken their own contention that the Greens stand no chance and, for another, they realise that steering clear of an official decision on this issue would spare them a heated discussion within the party should an orthometrical Red-Green majority become feasible after all.

Hints, especially by Herr Vogel, that the SPD might have to tolerate a CDU/CSU minority government and thus ensure at least a minimum of political influence show a certain amount of statesmanship but if sold outright they would strip the campaign of all verve.

Hans Reiser
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 February 1983)

FDP fights from one poll forecast to the next

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Opinion researchers have been known to err, as in Hamburg where they predicted a neck-and-neck contest between SPD and CDU and were far off the mark. They could also be wrong on the general election.

Even so, all parties try to get guidance from the opinion polls just before an election. They use the results like drunks holding on to a lamp post, not for the light but simply to have something to hang on to.

Moreover, the polls have become a major campaign weapon, as demonstrated by the many posters and stickers. The research institutes, on the other hand, deny that they are being used in this manner.

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Institutions leaning towards the present

coalition give the FDP four to five per cent, encouraging the party to speak of an upward trend.

FDP strategists realise that only a four before the decimal point in polls can prompt wavering voters to give their second vote to the Liberals after all.

But the opinion researchers provide no dependable information. Polls (even those of the most well-established institutes) are only a snapshot of public opinion at the time.

Their margin of error (conceded by the institutes) is between one and two per cent and frequently more, as in the case of the Hamburg election.

This larger error usually occurs as the result of unpredictable events in the final phase of the campaign.

Werner Hackmann, who heads the Hamburg electoral commission, has called for safeguards to prevent the public from being manipulated by polls.

This would include not only giving the number of people interviewed but also the number of those who actually answered the questions put to them.

Only with such information can the public see whether individual institutes have doctored their results for lack of concrete answers.

Einar Koch
(Hamburger Abendblatt, 7 February 1983)

CSU states its case

Bavaria's CSU was the last of the parties in the Bundestag to hold its campaign congress, a Franz Josef Strauss sparseshow.

Although he is Prime Minister of Bavaria, Herr Strauss has kept his options for Bonn wide open.

He told the meeting that the election could not be won with polemics alone and that clear issue-related arguments were needed.

Strauss's two-hour address to the 250 delegates was a masterpiece of oratory. He provided the campaigners with ample arguments for the election which, he said, would determine the nation's destiny until the year 2000.

Even if one does not wholly agree with the CSU leader's views on the deployment in Germany of the new generation of American Euromissiles, there can be no denying that his arguments are noteworthy.

He views the deployment decision as part of European-American partnership. As he puts it, if the Europeans in general and Germany in particular rejected a possible deployment of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles they would not trigger an instant Soviet attack.

They would trigger a process of estrangement from the USA that would make Europe increasingly subject to blackmail by the Soviet Union. The USA would always be able to defend itself against the USSR.

The CSU platform clearly shows the party's determination to emphasise more than hitherto its claim to be the true conservative force in the country, more so than its sister party, the CDU.

This is, of course, an act of self-assertion aimed at underscoring the CSU's position in the Bonn Club.

The emphasis is put on more internal security, a tougher policy towards aliens and a review of Bonn's development aid policy that would provide assistance only to Third World countries friendly to Germany.

An interesting point is the reaffirmation of the demand to hang on to the Interior Ministry should there be another coalition with the FDP.

The CSU naturally opposes the Free Democrats' bid for second votes. But apart from this, the Liberals were treated with moderation and the charges of co-responsibility for the nation's current woes have been all but dropped.

The impression is that Strauss no longer reckons with the FDP, concentrating instead on the SPD and its candidate Hans-Jochen Vogel. The target of the CSU's attack is, in fact, not so much the SPD as Vogel personally.

Franz Fegeler
(Nordwest Zeitung, 7 February 1983)

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budget through Congress and approved by US public opinion they are running the risk of losing an ally.

Could it be that military coupling of Germany and the United States by means of new nuclear missiles could trigger political decoupling?

The answer to this question is not to be found by waging psychological warfare on a section of German public opinion.

Why are Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles suddenly the sole guarantee of coupling? This is a question that cannot lightly be brushed aside.

Dieter Schröder
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 February 1983)

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Bonn Home Minister belies reputation

Friedrich Zimmermann as Interior Minister was arguably the greatest surprise to befall Bonn in the eventful autumn of 1982.

Could he pull it off? Had the Christian Democrats not, in giving him the job, laid an explosive charge in their coalition with the Free Democrats?

Had his appointment not presented opponents of the new coalition with what must have seemed a heaven-sent opportunity?

Was Dr Zimmermann not an even more attractive target for attack in the new government than Franz Josef Strauss, so long the whipping boy of German politics?

Herr Strauss had been the whipping boy for so long that more and more people had lost interest in both the whipping and the man himself.

Events took a different turn. The Free Democrats accepted the replacement of their own Gerhart Baum as Interior Minister by Dr Zimmermann of the CSU.

Right-wing and middle-of-the-road FDP leaders found the dismissal of Herr Baum by no means as inconvenient as they claimed.

FDP left-wingers were hopping mad but unable to gain the upper hand because the balance of power in the party had changed to their detriment.

The Social Democrats and their media supporters could hardly believe their eyes and ears as Dr Zimmermann, an opponent they could hardly have welcomed more in such a key post, studiously avoided giving offence.

It began with the new Interior Minister carrying on with his predecessor's environmental policies as though they were a matter of course.

In conventional home affairs, on the other hand, he exercised restraint, tel-



Friedrich Zimmermann
(Photo: Poly Press)

ling people who asked him what policies he planned to pursue that he must first consider the facts.

After due consideration he would then be going ahead with what he felt was appropriate and feasible, he said. That gained him time.

No-one can say for sure whether Dr Zimmermann will retain the home affairs portfolio if the Christian Democrats are returned to power in the polls next month (always assuming a general election is held).

No-one can tell which way the voting will go, and if the conservatives retain power there is sure to be a Cabinet reshuffle.

Yet even if Dr Zimmermann's tenure of the Interior Ministry were to end in a few weeks' time he could look back on his performance with satisfaction.

He has stood the test of Cabinet off-

ice in Bonn. That in itself is nothing new; he has so far passed every political test and successfully taken up every challenge in his career.

As general secretary of the Christian Social Union, the CDU's Bavarian ally, he transformed a loosely-knit group of politically-motivated people into an effective political party.

As chairman of the Bundestag defence committee he was an authority respected by political adversaries and military experts alike.

As leader of the CSU in the Bonn Bundestag he was an energetic and level-headed floor leader.

On the crisis staff set up to handle the abduction of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the Cologne employers' leader, by urban guerrillas in autumn 1977 he was noted for his sang-froid and the precision of his thinking.

At the helm of the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag he and Herr Kohl, the CDU leader, ensured there was a constant balance between the two parties.

These achievements testified to keen intelligence, to uncommon political instinct and to a desire for power Dr Zimmermann has never denied.

But the secret of his success is his self-control. He never lets himself go. Even in a small and intimate group he is never tempted to say anything he does not intend to say.

He may dislike others on his side of the political fence but he manages to prevent personal dislikes from coming to a head for years, if not decades.

This tends to make a man of upper middle-class Munich stock seem untypical of a Bavarian to some. He certainly conveys an impression of being a cool customer.

In many respects Friedrich Zimmermann is the exact opposite of Franz Josef Strauss, but that was the only way he was able to emerge as Herr Strauss's foremost political associate and retain the distinction.

Johann Georg Reissmüller
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 10 February 1983)

New Premier faces tough task in Kiel



Uwe Barschel

For the past 100 days the unwritten rules of the political close period have been in abeyance in Schleswig-Holstein.

Uwe Barschel has been state Premier in Kiel since 14 October 1982, when Gerhard Stoltenberg left to serve as Finance Minister in Bonn.

But he has been unable to rely on the 100 days' grace normally given because state assembly elections were due to be held this March.

With an election campaign in the offing, gestures of goodwill on the Opposition's part were virtually limited to con-

gratulations on the day he took over from Professor Stoltenberg.

Most state Premiers now to the job have been able to gain experience in their own good time. But this time it was different.

It was not a mid-term change planned well in advance but an unexpected transition with six months to go to general elections.

What was more, it took place in Kiel at a time when the overall political climate in Bonn was in a state of flux. So the twofold election campaign looked like being a tough proposition for all concerned.

Last but not least, unemployment took a turn for the worse last autumn, and Schleswig-Holstein, being somewhat off the beaten track in the far north of Germany, seemed sure to be harder hit than other parts of the country.

Barschel's policy was one of continuity combined with new accents, but it came in for stiff opposition from the start.

The mainstay of his programme, on which criticism was concentrated, was a

DM42m package designed to boost investment and create new jobs, as well as safeguarding existing ones.

The main objection to the package was that it relied on too much outside cash. The Social Democrats in Schleswig-Holstein are thus trying to turn the tables on Professor Stoltenberg's 1980 line of argument.

In the 1980 general election campaign the CDU Finance Minister, as he now is, argued that the SPD-led Bonn government was too heavily indebted.

The Schleswig-Holstein SPD now claims the CDU state government is relying on too much borrowed money. The aim is to throw Dr Barschel on to the defensive.

But Barschel is a fighter. An CDU leader in the state assembly he survived no-holds-barred debates without as much as a scratch.

He counters criticism by claiming that fresh issues and fresh problems call for fresh solutions, unpleasant though they might seem to the Social and Free Democrats.

But what else could Dr Barschel have done given the gloomy outlook for the state's shipyards in Kiel and elsewhere?

A shot in the arm for the shipyards is a keynote of the investment package designed, as the Premier puts it, to ensure that Schleswig-Holstein gets its fair share of the economic upswing.

So Opposition criticism is not whole-

Continued on page 9



Frank Dahrendorf

SPD Vogel campaign manager

Social Democrat Frank Dahrendorf and his brother Ralf Dahrendorf are the prominent Free Democrats' soul friends and political foes in the SPD's campaign to win the next four years.

They include Hans-Jochen Vogel, SPD Shadow Chancellor, and Ralf Vogel, the CDU Premier of Rhineland-Palatinate.

Richard von Weizsäcker, Mayor of Berlin, and Carl Friedrich von Oetmar, the philosopher, are another instance.

They all go to show that politics in the Federal Republic of Germany are not dominated by personal rivalry as to tear fraternal apart.

Frank Dahrendorf, the organisational coordinator of Hans-Jochen Vogel's election campaign, feels that he has contributed to making political life.

He and his brother owe their origins to their father, an SPD tag deputy and leader of the workers' movement who died in 1954.

Their father was sentenced to years in prison for his resistance to the Nazi regime in the aftermath of the 1944 failed bid to assassinate Hitler.

Brother Ralf, a sociology doctor, was in London and a rising star in the Free Democrats, was a Socialist before switching allegiance to the FDP.

Frank and Ralf agree that the sphere at the family home was a hot one. Berlin-boro Franz, 48, says he is unusually well with elder Ralf, 53, considering the difference in age between them.

Yet they seem poles apart because of the different career paths they have taken. Frank is the reserved of the two.

He is a practising lawyer who can afford to put in a four-month campaign stint on Hans-Jochen Vogel's behalf without charging even the bolle dollar for his services.

He has rented an apartment in Hönnef, near Bonn, for the campaign and says it is supposed to be a 35-hour week.

Continued on page 8

LABOUR

Bonn steps up the war on unemployment during German term in EEC chair

Unemployment is to be given priority by Bonn during its chairmanship of the EEC Council of Ministers in the first half of 1983.

Labour Minister Norbert Blüm will stress to vigorously work towards implementation of a project home-

out by Germany's employers associations.

For the scheme has been steadfastly opposed by Economic Affairs Minister Count Lambdorff. It is to cut employment by working less.

In purely arithmetical terms, 2.5 million of the Community's 11.5 million less could find work if the whole of Europe were to work one hour less a day, says a memorandum the EEC commission presented just before Christmas.

It stresses, however, that realities and human nature do not tally and that the actual effect would be much smaller.

For Richard, Britain's Labour social affairs commissioner at the EEC, says the memorandum that hours worked could be cut by eight to 12 per cent in EEC countries over the next four years.

But the Commission as a whole deleted this passage from the memorandum. This was probably prompted by the

fact that EEC heads of government, who met in Copenhagen late last November, had decided that the Council of Ministers should assess the effects of new working time regulations without taking any action.

The European Trade Union Federation has been dealing with the problem of a better distribution of existing work since 1978, long before the tide of unemployment hit Germany in 1981.

But since the unions demand that working times be shortened on full pay the move has consistently been opposed by Common Market employers.

British employers were the exception here because they found that shorter working times also meant less absenteeism and higher productivity.

But shorter working times in Britain did not result in jobs for the unemployed. On the contrary.

Having made a similar experience and worried about competitiveness, France's Socialist government stopped its drive to reduce work weeks to 35 hours when it reached the 39-hour mark.

Chairman Ernst Breit has conceded that a shorter work week is a cost factor and that this must be taken into account in collective bargaining.

Does this mean that he has dropped his demand for full wage adjustment (less work for the same pay)? How come the Bonn government prefers shorter working lives?

A: In terms of the national economy there is no such thing as shorter working times gratis. The trade unions are aware of this.

Labour and management must come to an agreement as to how much of the pay hike they are prepared to put into shorter working times.

Negotiations on shorter working weeks, and this brings me to your second question, are something to be thrashed out by the parties to collective bargaining.

I do, however, believe that a shorter working week would have the least effect on the labour market and that it would even have a negative effect on small and medium-sized companies.

The last thing we want is to make life hard for the small businessman. What we want is to make it easier for him to survive. We need small businesses for the sake of the workers.

Most of our work force is employed in this type of business, and their jobs must be safeguarded.

So far as the state's role is concerned, it can most effectively provide support in a move to shorten working lives. As a result, I intend to concentrate on this type of shorter working time, especially as this would have the greatest effect on the labour market.

Frankfurter Rundschau

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In its memorandum, based on a number of projections made in several EEC countries, the Commission arrives at the following conclusions.

Most companies would offset small reductions in working times through further rationalisation without hiring more staff.

The investment needed to rationalise would not result in more employment in the capital goods industry, at least not from one day to the next.

Cuts in working times in individual branches of industry or in some countries only would entail two dangers if they were implemented on the basis of fully adjusted wages — i.e. less work for the same money.

Either competitiveness would suffer and thus endanger existing jobs in the long run, or the companies concerned would be forced to rationalise, and this would again mean fewer jobs.

Shorter working times for proportionately less pay could create additional jobs if it made the company concerned more competitive and if it had no problems finding buyers for its goods or services.

But since shorter working times would result in higher productivity the need for additional staff would be limited.

One of the main union arguments against pay cuts in return for shorter working times, the reduced buying power of the work force and hence dwindling demand for consumer goods and services, has been rebutted in the memorandum.

The rebuttal is based on various projections made in a number of EEC countries that show shorter working times for less money would also mean less stoppages in the form of tax and social security contributions.

This would mean the take-home pay would decline less than gross pay.

The result would be a drop in public sector and social security revenues because the number of new jobs thus created would not rise correspondingly and so relieve public coffers of the expense of maintaining the jobless.

These reasons led to the decision to delete the passage recommended by Ivor Richard.

The conclusion reached by the Commission is that only a drastic cutback in working times throughout the Community and in one fell swoop would result in a reduction of unemployment.

In other words, the cutback in working times must be so heavy and sudden as to prevent industry from making up for it through higher productivity and rationalisation.

This, too, has its pitfalls. The Commission itself concedes that a shortening of the working day from eight to six hours or a correspondingly shorter working week or year could only be implemented if handled flexibly.

As the Commission sees it, the work-

Continued on page 6

How less work can mean more jobs — Blüm



Norbert Blüm

(Photo: Sven Simon)

Q: The government's annual economic report speaks of this intention in concrete terms, offering to thrash it out with the parties to collective bargaining.

Your Ministry is already drafting a bill that would enable workers to retire voluntarily at the age of 58. How do you intend to finance this?

A: As you thinking of the Böding Plan whereby half the additional cost is to be met by the parties to collective bargaining, and are the workers to forgo part of their annual pay hike?

A: The government is working on this. We cannot achieve in mere weeks what our predecessors omitted to do over the years. We're working on a solution at full speed.

But we need the cooperation of the parties to collective bargaining, and

Günter Böding is one of the most imaginative unionists.

The financing cannot be arranged without the unions and the employers. One of the possible models is for younger workers to forgo part of their wage increases to finance the early retirement of the older ones who are prepared to vacate their jobs for younger people.

Two points are obvious. Shorter working lives must not be at the expense of the social security pensions funds; and any arrangement that is arrived at must ensure that premature retirement is voluntary.

Q: After the general election the government wants to promote legislation for workers' participation in the nation's productive capital.

This is to ensure social symmetry in times of rising industrial incomes and at the same time boost investments.

But there is no overlooking the pitfalls in view of the opposition by both labour and management. How do you intend to cut this Gordian knot?

A: I'm not as pessimistic as you are. My impression is that the unions are beginning to realise that the policy of mere nominal wage hikes has reached its limit.

I don't think there's any knot for me to cut. The knot will untie itself of its own accord. The capital accumulation law we intend to pass in the next legislative period will promote this development.

After all, industry's liquid assets are not something that concerns business only. They equally concern the work force and the trade unions.

The more liquid funds a company has, the sounder it is commercially and the safer the jobs. Investments should not only serve rationalisation; they should also serve to make a better product.

Günter Kleer
(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 5 February 1983)

ECONOMY

Hopes of improvement but 2.5m out of work

Latest economic indicators are too conflicting to permit a clear forecast. Even so, further deterioration on the labour market and the clear rise in demand as reflected in industry's order books do not come as a surprise.

Bonn Labour Minister Norbert Blum (CDU) has termed the latest jobless figure of 2.5 million a disaster. Criticism of rising unemployment is justified though there is now more hope of a gradual improvement in the economic position.

But only campaigning politicians seem to be able to distill a forecast from the available bundle of indicators.

In its latest annual economic report released a couple of weeks ago, Bohn speaks of noticeable progress and Chancellor Helmut Kohl recently referred to unmistakable initial successes of his government's new fiscal and economic policy. He spoke of justifiable optimism.

Though the Labour Minister termed the joblessness a disaster that called for solidarity with those afflicted by it, he also called on the nation to have faith in the new government whose programme would bring about an upturn.

The SPD Opposition, on the other hand, maintains that the change of government has exacerbated the crisis, saying that a further decline will be inevitable without economic booster measures to be financed by deficit spending.

The overall picture is confusing. Yet our economic and fiscal policy makers still have to assess the further course of the economy based on conflicting indicators and take action accordingly.

Despite unemployment that is likely to deteriorate still further by election time in March, Bonn holds that there is no need for additional measures such as a medium term employment programme as called for by the Social Demo-

crats. The present government has termed the SPD demand harmful actionism.

The annual economic report, expressly presented as a fiscal and social government programme for the centre-right coalition expected to continue after the elections, justifies the government's stance, saying that change for the better has been ushered in.

It is true that conditions for an upturn have been improved, some of the improvement having come from the previous government.

The fact is that billions have been put aside for housing construction and that business in this sector has improved in an amazingly short time.

But the indicators show that this has not yet generated new jobs. There is much to indicate that business has picked up but that ultimate success will take its time.

Its failure to materialise immediately must therefore not be held against the government's programme.

The vaunted positive signs are not necessarily harbingers of an upturn. But they should not be ignored either. The competitiveness of German industry on world markets improved considerably in 1982.

Washington and Tokyo expect world trade to expand and this usually benefits Germany's export-oriented industry.

Moreover, Germany's success in fighting inflation has given the Bundesbank more scope for interest rate reductions which in turn must boost business.

Polls among business executives show a growing optimism, quite apart from the fact that the order books are beginning to swell again after a three-year decline.

Preliminary evaluations of the indicators show that the usual surge in orders towards the end of the year has this time not been followed by a slump in January.

Optimism in forecasting further developments would seem in order now if

this were matched by confidence that the current economic and fiscal policy would be continued.

Unfortunately, the campaign is accompanied by mudslinging and allegations that the Social Democrats want to introduce more government controls for business.

The counter-allegation is that the CDU is redistributing wealth from the have-nots to the haves, making for insecurity, thus retarding the upswing.

Frank J. Eichhorn
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 4 February 1983)

World trade down again, experts say

World trade will continue to decline in the first half of this year. But growth impulses are likely to gain the upper hand around the middle of the year, forecasts the HWWA Institute for Economic Research in Hamburg.

The world trade volume for 1983 will be somewhat lower than in 1982, making for the fourth year of stagnation.

Between 1960 and 1973 world trade grew at an annual rate of eight per cent.

Due to the critical situation of oil and raw materials exporting countries, any change for the better will have to come from the industrial world, says HWWA.

The first impulse are likely to materialise in the next few months in the USA because America's imports are likely to pick up due to the high dollar exchange rate and the gradual rise in domestic demand.

The rise of imports in the other industrial countries will be somewhat slower due to generally weak demand.

But things are likely to improve in the second half of the year.

One of the worst bugbears for world trade is the high foreign debt of many countries. The Hamburg economists hold that the necessary consolidation measures will lead to further import restrictions, especially in the oil importing developing countries.

This will be more pronounced the longer raw materials earnings remain low due to the recession in the industrial world.

dpa/VWD
(Die Welt, 7 February 1983)

Less work

The Commission also suggests drastic cutbacks in working times at less than a full corresponding pay reduction and subsidies from government unemployment funds that would theoretically be offset by a lesser amount paid to the jobless.

The memorandum does not mention certain other problems like the full autonomy of the parties to collective bargaining that exists in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Even so, the memorandum has provided the trade unions and the employers with a basis for discussion.

In view of the 11.5 million jobless in the Community they should get on with it with the objective of arriving at concrete decisions.

National attempts at solving the problems are likely to founder on the disadvantages they would entail in competing in the Common Market.

An interesting aspect here is that the

working year in the ten Community nations differs much less than working weeks would suggest.

Unemployment is unlikely to be licked by shorter working times, the memorandum seems to say. But there can be little doubt that paring down working times will reduce the number of jobless and, above all, prevent further layoffs.

The memorandum substantiates this by citing individual companies that have drastically pared down their working times.

Another approach suggested by the Commission is more part-time work. The EEC Council of Ministers has come up with guidelines aimed at eliminating discrimination against part-time workers.

Another set of guidelines for temporary work is now ready to be presented.

It remains to be seen whether the German chairmanship of the Council of Ministers will succeed in bringing preliminary moves to fruition.

Erich Hauger
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 2 February 1983)

German govt sell better than ever

Official foreign trade statistics prove the carefully nurtured contention that German business has its competitiveness on international markets.

1982, statistics show, was a year for Germany's exporters. Multistriped imports by DM 1.3 billion surplus unique in this post-war history.

The 1981 balance of trade in Germany's favour was thus almost last year, primarily because of exports outstripping the growth of imports.

For the first time in three years Germany's exports were sufficient to balance the nation's balance of trade (which includes transfers) and even create a surplus.

The contention frequently made the past few years that the German export sector was in a state of decline is disproved along with the claim that German suppliers find it harder to compete on world markets.

The opposite is true. German exporters have become the envy of other nations.

The flood of exports from Germany has turned into an embolism for industries abroad where the decline is pronounced.

This has led to calls for barriers against the successful goods, and that includes other market countries.

Proud though Germany may be of last year's export figures, she should not lose sight of the fact that the sense of security for the foreign market is still shaky.

Many of this country's foreign partners are so hard hit by the slump as to be almost unable to pay money for imports.

To make matters worse, unemployment everywhere still calls for protectionist measures. The main victim would be Germany's heavy export dependence.

But protectionist measures are the only threat to Germany's position as the world's champion export competition is also trying to keep many from domestic markets.

Industry must step up its efforts. Germany is to retain its competitive edge and new products weather growing competition.

Those who are caught napping have to opt out of the market, demonstrated by Germany's phony try.

By the same token, those who imagine they will stand their ground against the competition, as demonstrated by the German auto industry warding off Japanese competition.

But economic policy makers must not rely on exports once more. At least part of the lack of demand. There are too many imbalances.

Still, Germany's export business managed to get off to a good start in 1983. The balance of trade was one of the positive "legacies" of Helmut Kohl inherited from his predecessor.

Richard O...

Farm incomes up again

Farm earnings were up 7.7 per cent in 1981/82 and are expected to have equalled this performance in the 1982/83 agricultural year, says the Ministry of Agriculture in Bonn. The increase will thus far outstrip the national average.

The positive forecast is largely due to the generally good harvest in 1982. The yield of wheat, fruit, vegetables and wine was markedly higher than in the previous year and there were record harvests for some crops.

Farmers' animal feed harvests were also good, enabling them to stock up on winter feed. The harvests of sugar beet and potatoes were poorer than in the previous year.

Exports at the Bonn Agriculture Ministry expect producer prices in 1982/83 to be roughly the same as the year before.

Though prices for fruit, wine, vegetables, potatoes and sugar beet could drop, this would be offset by higher prices for milk, livestock and grain, which are the most important products of full-time farmers.

Farmers' costs are likely to go up three per cent in 1982/83. But there is unlikely to be much change in the quantities required.

It is also unlikely that farmers will have to buy more additional animal feed than last year after such good harvests.

The 7.7 per cent rise in farm incomes per working family member in 1981/82 was not enough to offset the 12.6 per cent drop the previous year.

The German Farmers Association says farmers still have to make up for lost ground. Its forecast does not tally with Agriculture Ministry projections. The association's figure is only about three per cent.

On presenting the report, Agriculture Minister Josef Ertl told the Press that although industrial wages in 1981/82 had risen only 3.8 per cent, industrial workers earned on average of DM32,176 per annum, considerably more than the average farm income.

But agriculture experts say that comparisons of this nature prove little.

Incomes per farm rose by an average 5.9 per cent to DM28,587 in 1981/82. Over the past decade, incomes per family member working the farm rose by an annual average of 3.7 per cent and per farm by 4.2 per cent.

Incomes from part-time farming rose at roughly the same rate as those on full-time farms: up 5.5 per cent to DM16,615, making for a total family income of DM34,520.

Part-time farmers' incomes in 1981/82 were determined by rising farm and non-farm incomes in 1981/82, making for an average per family income of DM36,268, up 6.1 per cent.

Generally, farms in the north did better than in the south. While farms cultivating the same crops every year saw their profits up 49.2 per cent and processing operations showed a plus of 31.8 per cent, those growing feed crops showed only a slight rise of 3.2 per cent.

Fruit growers for the market showed lower incomes for the third year in a row (minus 4.6 per cent).

Hans-Jürgen Mahnk...



Chancellor: Bonn head of state Karl Carstens is welcomed to the Green Week agricultural fair in West Berlin. (Photo: dpa)

portant source of farm incomes. According to the CMA, 70 per cent of farm incomes come from livestock.

More than 50 per cent of German food imports come from other EEC countries. German exports to other Common Market members rose 7.3 per cent to DM13.9bn, an above-average growth rate.

Growth was most pronounced in exports to Italy where sales amounted to DM4.7bn, up 17.6 per cent against the previous year.

But there has been a marked decline in exports to the Middle East, formerly a growth market, due to dwindling oil revenues. Here, German exports were down 17.2 per cent to about DM1bn.

Iran has cut back 38 per cent to DM221m, and prospects are unlikely to improve, especially in the light of the founded Opec conference in Geneva last month.

The popularity growth of German food is also pronounced in Spain. Spaniards bought DM88.1m worth of German food last year, up 13.7 per cent against the previous year.

German marketing strategists are already preparing for Spain's accession to the Community.

Says Böcking: "We've had one foot in the door for years and as soon as Spain becomes a member we'll get the other foot in as well." This strategy has proved its worth in Greece where German exports trebled in 1981 when that country joined the Community, reaching DM592m.

Yet Böcking's outlook for the future is bleak: "We must be satisfied if we manage to maintain the 1982 growth rate because there's no improvement in the world economy in sight and competition is bound to become fiercer."

In his opening address at the Berlin fair Agriculture Minister Josef Ertl warned of a murderous price war between the EEC and the USA. He said that the winner in such a war would be the East Bloc in general and the USSR in particular.

Helke Braun
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 4 February 1983)

Farmers start to feel the pinch

Competition on the world's food markets has stiffened and German farmers, who have just shown their prowess at Berlin's 48th International Week agricultural fair, are feeling the pinch. Fat export years with last year, primarily because of exports outstripping the growth of imports.

The Central Marketing Agency for Produce (CMA) in Bonn estimates that German food producers exported goods worth DM22bn last year, a 25 per cent up on 1981, when growth was 25 per cent.

The 4.2 per cent rise in the 1982 tonnage sold (1981: 9.3 per cent) to a total living beyond their means has been disproved along with the claim that German suppliers find it harder to compete on world markets.

The flood of exports from Germany has turned into an embolism for industries abroad where the decline is pronounced.

This has led to calls for barriers against the successful goods, and that includes other market countries.

Proud though Germany may be of last year's export figures, she should not lose sight of the fact that the sense of security for the foreign market is still shaky.

Many of this country's foreign partners are so hard hit by the slump as to be almost unable to pay money for imports.

To make matters worse, unemployment everywhere still calls for protectionist measures. The main victim would be Germany's heavy export dependence.

But protectionist measures are the only threat to Germany's position as the world's champion export competition is also trying to keep many from domestic markets.

Industry must step up its efforts. Germany is to retain its competitive edge and new products weather growing competition.

Those who are caught napping have to opt out of the market, demonstrated by Germany's phony try.

By the same token, those who imagine they will stand their ground against the competition, as demonstrated by the German auto industry warding off Japanese competition.

But economic policy makers must not rely on exports once more. At least part of the lack of demand. There are too many imbalances.

Still, Germany's export business managed to get off to a good start in 1983. The balance of trade was one of the positive "legacies" of Helmut Kohl inherited from his predecessor.

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■ NATO

No First Use calls for a more effective conventional Western deterrent



Nato has changed its military strategy from time to time over the years, but on one point defence policy-makers have not changed their minds.

There is still the threat of a conventional military attack on the North Atlantic pact developing into a nuclear clash as a result of Nato's deterrent strategy.

For over 30 years this strategy has ensured that despite enormous arms build-ups there has never been a military clash between the two blocs.

But there are growing fears in the West that the nuclear threat could, if the situation arose, lead to nuclear suicide by the countries concerned.

A group of US and European experts has published in several Western capitals a report calling on the United States to renounce first use of nuclear weapons.

The Union of Concerned Scientists includes former US Defence Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Kennedy's security adviser George F. Kennan and Britain's Field-Marshal Lord Carver.

They agree that the United States could not make any such declaration until after thorough preparation and deliberate strengthening of its conventional forces and those of the Western alliance.

But it would then in no way jeopardise the security of the United States and its allies. Indeed, it would considerably heighten it.

The starting point for their deliberations is the fear that Nato strategy, which is currently strongly based on the nuclear deterrent, might in some future crisis be obliged actually to resort to the nuclear option and trigger an atomic apocalypse.

So the alliance's aim must be to limit the nuclear deterrent to that of deterring a nuclear attack by the other side, whereas conventional attacks must be deterred by a corresponding conventional capacity.

In the past the Nato countries have rejected the Soviet offer of a reciprocal renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.

Their argument is that the Warsaw Pact states' superiority in the conventional sector was so substantial that in the long run Nato could only resist it by means of nuclear weapons.

But the concerned scientists' report, outlined in Bonn by McGeorge Bundy, disputes the existence of such a substantial superiority on the Warsaw Pact's part.

It is said by no means to be so great as to ensure success in the event of an attack on Nato, certainly not if the Nato countries were swift to react.

The ratio is estimated to be between 1 to 1.5 and 1 to 1.7, whereas for defence purposes a ratio of two to one is sufficient.

Besides, Nato is far superior technologically, and in times of crisis the Warsaw Pact bears the burden of internal tension.

Western conventional deterrent capacity could and should be improved

at relatively modest expense: \$100bn, or a real annual growth rate of roughly two per cent in military expenditure.

That would be enough to ensure both a credible deterrent and successful defence.

The emphasis must be on fortifications and obstacles along the border with the Warsaw Pact, on more underground hangars for aircraft and on an increase in supplies of ammunition and equipment.

This increase would be the most expensive improvement, being intended to ensure that Nato was able to wage conventional war for 30 days, as against the current fifteen.

The mobility of Nato forces is also to be improved, with equipment being laid on and at the ready for additional US forces in Europe.

Such far-reaching changes in Nato strategy will, so the authors of the report hope, lead not only to a relaxation of tension in ties with the Soviet Union and to a substantial reduction in the risk of nuclear war.

They are also expected to improve cohesion within Nato, given that current strategy leads to tension and doubts among the Western allies.

A new strategy based on renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons naturally encounters strong misgivings in Nato.

There can be no denying that the existing deterrent strategy has prevented not only a nuclear clash between the superpowers but also a direct conventional conflict between them.

The threshold beyond which conflicts might be escalated to the stage of military confrontation would undoubtedly be lowered if the risk of nuclear weapons being used no longer applied.

Despite the appalling nature of conventional warfare today its consequences are more calculable than those of a nuclear clash.

It must naturally be borne in mind that in view of the frightful consequences

of using nuclear weapons Nato would first try to limit hostilities to the conventional level.

So why, or so advocates of the nuclear deterrent argue, should the West dispense with the additional threat?

The report claims that doubts whether Nato would in fact go ahead with what amounted to a suicidal first strike undermined the credibility of its nuclear deterrent.

This is surely an argument that carries weight, although in view of the catastrophe a nuclear war would entail even a slight possibility of conventional warfare leading to nuclear hostilities would retain a powerful deterrent effect.

The report also notes that there is an inclination within Nato to rely on the nuclear deterrent and to neglect the conventional efforts that need putting in.

Assuming the deterrent were to fail to deter, that could lead to the West soon facing the decision whether to resort to nuclear weapons or not.

The 17 authors of the report conclude that it would be unrealistic to bank on sound and adequate conventional defences as long as one retained any idea of escalating conflict to the nuclear level.

In other words, politicians and military men are not going to do what needs to be done to ensure there is an adequate conventional deterrent capacity until the first use of nuclear weapons has been renounced.

A moot question is whether Nato is in a position to boost its conventional defence capacity sufficiently to rule out military clashes in the event of crisis.

The West's geographical position is definitely less favourable, especially if it is assumed that a conflict is in fact any length of time.

The report does not gloss over the problems. It outlines them seriously and without the slightest trace of polemics.

The authors of the report are un-

Vogel's campaign manager

Continued from page 4

apartment, but doesn't spend much time there.

Yet Dahrendorf is not the type to call to mind the camp bed Hans-Jochen Vogel is said to have in his office, and he has been known to remind Herr Vogel that his services are provided voluntarily.

The two men made each other's acquaintance when Dahrendorf was Justice Senator in Hamburg and Vogel Justice Minister in Bonn.

In 1981 Herr Vogel appointed him Home Affairs Senator in Berlin when he was mayor of the divided city.

Dahrendorf had spent eight years as a state councillor, a kind of state secretary, in Hamburg, six at the home affairs department and two at the education department.

The latter, he ironically recalls, was a punishment posting to which he was transferred by Hamburg burgomaster Hans-Ulrich Klose.

But he shows no signs of ambitions over and above the desire to coordinate Herr Vogel's election campaign. He plans to return to Hamburg whatever the election outcome is.

His family seem to be chips off the old block. His wife is a former hockey player who was capped for Germany. He himself has served as chairman of the Hamburg Hockey Association.

His sons, aged 16 and 18, are politically aware, he says, but he hasn't asked his elder son which way he voted in Hamburg last December.

Is there any political friction between him and his sons? No, he claims; they are not a family given to friction. That may be one reason why he prefers not to become a full-time politician.

But that is not to say that Frank Dahrendorf is not an eminently suitable candidate for political office in either Berlin or Hamburg.

Helmut Herles

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 7 February 1983)

doubtedly right in noting, in word, that nuclear war is an extension of war to a higher violence but an entirely new phenomenon.

No matter how much suffering conventional war can cause it leaves peoples and structures with which mankind can regenerate.

Total nuclear war, on the other hand, would destroy the people, the mind and cultures of the nations and damage the rest of the planet in unforeseeable but dangerous ways.

Thomas L...

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1983)

Plea to end strategy for suicide

No First Use, the report of the Union of Concerned Scientists, makes three main contributions to the security policy debate.

First, it is a crucial contribution to the long overdue strategy debate in the Western alliance.

The first use of nuclear weapons, at least the first use option, is a key feature of Nato's flexible strategy for over 30 years.

The dangerous nature of the doctrine, which they call a suicide, has prompted the authors to pen their report.

They call for renunciation of use option and replacement by a calculable conventional response to a nuclear attack.

Second, the report makes it clear that a qualified conventional defence could be struck within the framework of Western defence budgets.

A two-per-cent increase in spending per annum in real terms over a six-year period is felt to be sufficient to achieve this.

The authors say the Warsaw superiority is nothing dramatic. She relays via the TV screen every hint for the handicapped by the handicapped.

Such small-scale videotex users as these are now worried they will no longer be able to afford the facility once the costs start to spiral.

Bildschirmtext has been available experimentally for three years in Düsseldorf and Berlin.

Starting with the Berlin Radio Show last September the service is gradually being extended all over the country.

By the end of the year it will be available in Krefeld, Aachen, Frankfurt, Mainz, Saarbrücken, Hamburg, Stuttgart and Mannheim.

By the end of March 1984 a further 20 cities are to be wired in, and the Bundespost has clear ideas on the number of subscribers it is expecting to have.

There should be 150,000 by the end of 1984, 400,000 by the end of 1985 and a million by the end of 1986. The Bundespost is to invest DM500m in the new medium.

Adalbert Rohloff of the Berlin chamber of commerce and industry says as spokesman for commercial users of the videotex service it is useful for the Bundespost to announce details of the fees it intends to charge.

Sensible charges will restore order to the Bildschirmtext system," he feels. When you have to pay for the system you are going to take your programme

MEDIA

Videotex is to go nationwide after three years of trials

seriously and not just look on it as a technical playing."

The fees now announced, he says, are more in keeping with the market and the costs than the charges the Post Office originally planned.

But they are confusing enough. Subscribers will pay DM9 per month. The fee for computer storage per page of information will be 7.5 pfennigs per day nationwide and 1.5 pfennigs per region.

The fee for transmission of information (electronic letterbox facility), as opposed to merely retrieving and relaying it, will be 40 pfennigs per page.

Installation will cost DM55. Regional users will pay a monthly rental of DM50, nationwide users possibly DM350.

Yet Herr Rohloff is not entirely satisfied. He and commercial users feel the Bundespost has no justification for charging the full nationwide fee in 1984 and 1985.

During the transitional period the service will not be fully available all over the country.

The last word, he says, cannot yet have been spoken on charges during the difficult transitional period.

The scientific advisory panel in North-Rhine-Westphalia also deals with the fees problem in its short report. The panel feel charges ought not to benefit large companies and major users.

The system, the charges and the legal provisions must ensure equality of opportunity as a matter of principle for all parties interested in using the facility.

The panel have since 1978 probed not only the repercussions of the new medium on the media but also the social, cultural and economic consequences.

They are worried that the services provided by non-profit users will stand no chance of holding their own against powerful commercial competitors.

This prospect so worries them that they recommend subsidies in such circumstances.

As a general rule and contribution to

widened equality of opportunity the system and its technical details ought to be devised so as not to prevent access to a would-be user.

In other respects the panel have no objections to the introduction of videotex. Consumer protection is another important point in the checklist drawn up by the North Rhine-Westphalian panel. They feel fees and charges should be billed in detail.

In other words, bills should contain details of all services subscribers use. But detailed statements of account must only be referred to commercial users if there are disputes over the bill.

Otherwise the accounts would be wide open to data abuse and computer snooping. Another point is that to protect the consumer all advertising relayed to subscribers should be denoted as such.

The first generation of videotex subscribers is said to differ substantially from the population as a whole in some respects.

It includes a high proportion of self-employed and managerial staffs and very few members of the working class.

Most subscribers are extremely interested in technology and generally more interested in information than the wider public.

But only limited use is made of the service. In Düsseldorf subscribers use it for only a little over half an hour a week.

The service most frequently consulted is the news. Videotex does not disturb family life and subscribers are not distracted from other leisure activities.

Brighte Kummerer-Jöbges, who has been following the progress of videotex in Berlin, says subscriber interest is relatively stable, as is the interest shown by commercial users.

Nearly 90 per cent users plan to continue using the system from next autumn when it starts to go nationwide and to charge more than nominal fees.

In the overwhelming majority of Berlin households with a videotex adapter

Continued from page 1

Europe. What course may events take between the general election and the year's end? Regardless who is Chancellor in Bonn, the German leader must urge the superpowers to come to terms by autumn.

Provided Moscow feels Bonn and other Nato governments are likely to abide by the dual-track resolution and Washington does not entirely abandon common sense a compromise ought to be conceivable.

The Russians might, for instance, scrap some of their missiles while retaining some aimed at targets in Western Europe and others aimed at targets in Asia.

The Americans would station a limited number of Cruise missiles, and maybe a few Pershing 2s, in Europe.

As each Soviet SS-20 system has three warheads and US missiles have only one each, a tacit acknowledgement of the British and French nuclear deterrent might be conceivable.

No Bonn government could possibly reject US armaments based in Germany with Soviet consent without prompting a serious Nato crisis.

families plan to retain the service. Similar findings have been reached in Düsseldorf.

These research findings are to be used by the Land Prime Ministers and state assemblies when they draw up videotex regulations.

They will be due to do so as soon as the experimental phase, including countrywide trials, has come to an end.

It will be the first time standards have been drawn up for a new medium in Germany. Land Prime Ministers have already agreed in principle to a uniform Videotex Act.

Their aim is to make do with as few regulations as possible but as many as are necessary.

Everyone, for instance, will be entitled to use the service. In Düsseldorf and Berlin a permit has first had to be applied for.

The draft even deals with opinion polls via videotex. They are to be banned on issues under consideration by the Bundestag, state assemblies or local councils.

For six weeks before elections there will be a ban on relaying via videotex the findings of videotex opinion polls.

The maximum fine that can be imposed for this and other breaches of the videotex code is to be increased from DM10,000 to DM50,000.

Users are now keen to see the Videotex Bill ratified without delay by the state assemblies. There are no reasons why the system should not be introduced, they announced before a meeting of Land Prime Ministers in Bonn.

"The Act takes all known problems into account. Users plan to make their contribution toward a service in accordance with the law and in the subscribers' interest by means of self-control."

"The new information and communication system is of major social significance for the future of communications."

Alfred Ditt

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 5 February 1983)

Tough task

Continued from page 4

heartily endorsed by the trade unions for once.

Seldom have the unions been so kindly disposed toward economic and labour market policy measures undertaken by a CDU government.

Even so, Dr Barschel's first 100 days have been for the most part a testing period in economic and financial policy.

His new accents also include greater consideration for the interests of the Danish minority even though the SSW, the Danish minority's political party, is likely to remain pro-SPD.

But Dr Barschel has preferred to make a gesture to promote peace and quiet in a sector where sensitivities are easily aroused.

His entire policy has been designed with more than election day in mind. His plans for media policy, for instance, will not come into their own until the new state assembly is in session.

In political continuity he has another point in common with his predecessor, Gerhard Stoltenberg. To retain power he must make sure of an absolute majority for the CDU.

Like Professor Stoltenberg on past occasions he can set aside any hopes of forming (and heading) a coalition government in the state.

Joost Springensguth

(Kieler Nachrichten, 21 January 1983)

Erich Häuser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 February 1983)

■ ENVIRONMENT

Seaweed converts sewage into fertiliser, power

Kiel marine botanists report remarkable success in using Baltic algae to purify and reactivate sewage. It is a case of the mighty microbe, or arguably the *Heinzelmännchen*, Cologne's handy little helpers and German cousins of the leprechauns.

The algae have been harnessed to purify effluent and generate biomass for use as either fertiliser or energy. Above all they process phosphates and nitrous compounds that other processes fail to extract from the sewage.

Winfried Schramm and Werner Lehnberg of the marine botany department at Kiel University set out to see the extent to which algae could be systematically used to recycle anorganic nutrients, other purification techniques failed to extract from effluent.

They mixed sea water and sewage and gave the mixture a shot of Baltic green algae, which are remarkably adaptable to variations in salt content.

The algae flourished in the mixture, using up in a relatively short time (it depended on the temperature) the vegetable nutrients nitrogen and phosphates that were not eliminated in prior purification.

The algae output from the sewage tanks can be used either as agricultural fertiliser or converted into biogas by means of bacteria.

Sewage is seldom colder than about 10 degrees centigrade, so it heats the

sewage ponds to a temperature ideally suited as a working climate for the bacteria.

The methane generated could be used to power heat pumps to heat the fermentation tanks and further boost the methane output.

What the Kiel marine botanists are doing in controlled conditions in their experimental tanks is a process that is a problem in many waters that are saturated in vegetable nutrient.

But if the process can be harnessed in artificial sewage ponds or marine shallows it may prove a twofold winner.

For one it will purify sewage and reduce pollution of the open sea that has reached alarming proportions in many parts of the Baltic.

For another it will recycle for use as biomass nitrous compounds and phosphates an excess of which is using up oxygen and causing the biological death of rivers and waterways.

Similar experiments are in progress in Scandinavia, some in shallow coastal waters. Drawbacks that were feared have failed to materialise.

The algae, it was feared, would be enriched in heavy metals, but these heavy metals have been found to be returned to the sewage sludge during an earlier stage of purification.

The Bonn Research Ministry has invested DM500,000 in the Kiel trials over the past three years. Large-scale



Mobile pollution sleuth

This mobile gas tester made in Heidelberg is a pollution sleuth used in the Republic of Germany to check atmospheric and water pollution. It can run at least six hours on a cooler engine's consistent results. It can run at least six hours on a cooler engine's consistent results. It can run at least six hours on a cooler engine's consistent results.

trials may one day be undertaken off the Baltic coast.

North Sea water has a much higher salt count, but if it were sufficiently diluted by a nutrient mixture from the Baltic the algae might serve their purpose in the North Sea too.

Schramm and Lehnberg plan to try out their technique in the Philippines as well. Temperatures are ideal there, so the algae output should be substantial.

Red algae, or furcellaria, could also be put to good use in effluent, they

claim. This category of algae is especially that is used to thicken industrial sludge and to thicken industrial sludge and to thicken industrial sludge.

But natural sources of red algae are not as plentiful as the demand, and a suitable substitute has yet to be found on the South-East Asia.

Algae cultures in a mixture of water and sewage could help fill the gap, the Kiel marine botanists

claim. At the time, he regarded this approach as a threat and coercion.

In his letter he drew attention to a Bundeswehr agency that should be looked into not only by the commissioner but by the public at large as well: the Institute for Military Medical Statistics and Information in Remagen.

The institute houses the central medical computer of the Bundeswehr and is under the jurisdiction of the Bonn Defence Ministry.

The data bank contains 180 million individual documents relating to all medical induction procedures, check-ups and medical histories in general.

A still larger data bank stores all personal information and a register of files. Other information is stored in non-computerised paper form. The institute is said to pass on 55,000 items of information a year.

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OUR WORLD

Bonn data abuse commissioner is denied access to Bundeswehr medical files

His interest aroused, Hans-Peter Bull decided to look into the gigantic data bank with its information on millions of young Germans. He found it understandable that Rev. Fassnacht was worried.

The commissioner's arrival at the institute turned into the biggest defeat of his watchdog career. An institute representative told him that the Institute's data bank was no business of his and denied him access.

The Bonn Defence Ministry thus joined other Federal authorities in barring the commissioner from their information set-up, in keeping with the current trend in Bonn.

The reason given to Bull was that the institute's bank did not fall in the category of electronic data storage for which his post was created.

Yet the institute did not deny that a data bank existed and that the information was processed electronically.

Moreover, the institute contended that giving him access to the bank would violate medical secrecy.

This line of argument is a novelty in the assortment of subterfuges with which to prevent the commissioner from exercising his function.

The logic behind it is totally paradoxical because Bull is himself subject to professional secrecy and was appointed to his post by the Bundestag with the express task of safeguarding personal data from abuse.

The institute argued that they could not give him access to the data bank without express permission from the persons on file.

What it all amounts to is that the institute's hypocritical emphasis on medical secrecy undermines this very secrecy.

Yet Bull's visit to the institute was not totally futile because it brought what the commissioner with his usual understatement called an annoying nuisance to light.

Back in 1980, a draftee who was discharged on medical grounds complained that his medical records were kept on file at the institute although he no longer had anything to do with the Bundeswehr.

In November 1981 at a US Army ammunition dump in Wellerbach, near Kaiserslautern, a civilian German

ward's rifle went off. The bullet hit a highway freight car full of missile propulsion units and set the car alight.

It could have been much worse had the bullet hit the neighbouring car which was full of high explosives.

Half Kaiserslautern would have been blasted to kingdom come," says Heinrich Linden, a Public Sector and Transport Workers Union (ÖTV) official who handles union matters connected with civilians working for the Allied forces.

The incident, the union says, demonstrates the risks run by the 3,000 civilian guards working for the US Army and the British Army of the Rhine.

The guards' annual payroll fluctuates 95 per cent are given only a few days of training, and the M 16, widely used in Vietnam, is an assault weapon and totally unsuitable for guard duty,

says Linden.

All of this put together is why the union is contemplating its first industrial action against the Allied forces.

ÖTV has for the past two years been asking the Allies to do away with these

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At that time, the Bonn Defence Ministry agreed that such data should be kept for statistical purposes only and that the name of the person concerned should therefore be deleted.

Bonn informed Bull that the 40,000 or so men who were discharged on medical grounds would henceforth have their data stored anonymously.

The data commissioner trusted the Defence Ministry at the time. But his visit to the institute showed that what had become known as the anonymity decree was not passed until two years later, on 29 July 1982. It was lifted again by Bonn on 4 January 1983.

Too many people committed to mental hospital

Too many people are sent to mental hospitals too often for inadequate reasons, say Rhineland local authorities in charges levelled at law enforcement agencies, health authorities, doctors and judges.

One in five medical certificates leading to the enforced commitment to a mental home does not stand up to a critical analysis.

The authorities' charges are based on a survey of commitment practices in the Duisburg area where mental cases are sent to the Viersen mental hospital.

490 of the 820 inmates of the Viersen hospital were committed by Duisburg authorities in 1981.

The survey concludes that these enforced commitments are frequently too hasty and unfounded.

The study was prompted by mounting complaints by mental institution patients from Duisburg and by the fact that "we learned about a shabby practice by the traffic authorities in several North Rhine-Westphalian cities."

"They withdrew the driving licences of people who had at one time been committed to a mental institution," says Albert Stockbrand of the Rhineland

Now, the names of the discharged men may again be stored at the Institute although the Bundeswehr does not need their data at all because they have nothing to do with it.

Not only did Bull receive no explanation; he was in fact never told that the anonymity decree had been rescinded.

In any event, he was unable to find out whether the names had been deleted or not because he and his team were shown the door.

The nature of the data stored at the Institute and the recipients of the 55,000 items of information passed on every year thus remain the secret of the Defence Ministry.

Hans-Peter Bull is therefore unable to answer Rev. Fassnacht's letter. The Bundeswehr has little use for protection against data abuse.

Hanno Kühnert
(Die Zeit, 28 January 1983)

Too many people committed to mental hospital

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
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(Frankfurter Rundschau, 8 February 1983)

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Meteorological stations all over the world



supplied the data arranged in see-at-a-glance tables in these new reference works. They include details of air and water temperature, precipitation, humidity, sunshine, physical stress of climate, wind conditions and frequency of thunderstorms.

These figures compiled over the years are invaluable both for planning journeys to distant countries and for scientific research.

Basic facts and figures for every country in the world form a preface to the tables. The emphasis is on the country's natural statistics, on climate, population, trade and transport.

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Two volumes are already in print. They are:

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Europe/USRR, app. 190 pp., DM 24.80.

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■ THE SCREEN

Germany's
answer to
Holocaust

Hannoversche Allgemeine

Holocaust, the American TV film about a Jewish family under the Nazis, has twice been screened nationwide in Germany.

One of the many questions it prompted was why it had taken an American film to deal, for German viewers, with the extermination of the Jews in the Third Reich.

Put this way it is an unfair question, since footage about Hitler and what he entailed that has been shown on TV in Germany would fill entire archives.

Yet nothing has so appealed to the emotions and gripped viewers as Holocaust, fictionalised as the tale of a family the viewer could identify with.

The secret of its appeal is that in seeing how the Weiss family suffers, Holocaust viewers can imagine they might have been the victims instead.

The Oppermanns, shown nationwide on 6 and 7 February, can fairly be said to be Germany's answer to Holocaust.

As a media event the two-part film based on the novel by Lion Feuchtwanger likewise assumed American proportions.

It was shown simultaneously on TV in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Britain and Ireland and by three US stations.

Other broadcasting corporations to feature the film will be those of Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Canada and Iceland.

The Oppermanns deserves such a wide showing, and unlike Holocaust it cannot be derided as soap opera.

The only point it has in common is the basic pattern, being a family drama with which viewers can identify.

The Oppermanns goes on to be much more detailed than Holocaust. Instead of depicting an entire era, it concentrates on a single question:

How could Germans who deeply detested Hitler quietly and idly stand by and look on as he seized power?

In film-span The Oppermanns is limited. It covers a six-month period from November 1932 to April 1933.


Continued from page 11

to bring out its big guns because of the likelihood that the problems will mount in the months to come.

A host nation support agreement concluded last spring between Germany and the United States provides for a tripling of US ammunition dumps, says Linden.

Another point that worries the union is the repeated burglaries at Allied installations. In December 1981, for instance, some 100 kilos of explosives were stolen from an American depot.

The Federal Prosecutor's Office attributed the theft to terrorist circles; the gun that killed Hesse Economic Affairs Minister Heinz Herbert Karry was also



An SA man, played by Herbert Chwolska, tries to stop Martin Oppermann, played by Wolfgang Kieling, from entering the family's furniture store in Egon Monk's TV film of The Oppermanns.

(Photo: ZDF)

Since Feuchtwanger's novel was written in 1933 much authentic contemporary atmosphere is included that is missing from Holocaust.

The Oppermanns own a Berlin furniture store. They are well-to-do middle-class people who have been hit by the Depression but not had to limit their own way of life in any way.

The Oppermanns are Jews and thus people who ought to have been predestined to fight Hitler and what he stood for. They had been told often enough what they could expect if he came to power.

Yet a feature characteristic of their outlook is that they abandon any idea of resistance in autumn 1932 and plan to merge with a competitor, a furniture dealer owned by an Aryan family.

Later, when it is already too late, they bank on tactics, on conformism, on self-deceit. They persuade themselves it won't be so bad after all.

Nazi-Jewish opponents of Hitler are much the same. The conservative Ministry official, the genially thundering doctor and the Liberal headmaster are all disgusted or outraged by what is happening.

Egon Monk, who directed the film and wrote the screenplay, can be complimented on having solved well the constant problem of filming a work of literature.

He has dealt with the novel respectfully, for the most merely abridging and rearranging the material, adapting it to meet the requirements of the new medium, TV.

Yet his film version stands on its own alongside the novel as a distinct and separate artistic achievement.

Monk has made a point of casting the

film in a mould at times almost documentary. He does so for the most part by resorting to three means.

He has arranged events in strict chronological order, beginning with the November 1932 general election that seemed at the time to mark the beginning of Hitler's decline.

We are then taken to January 1933 and the Nazi take-over and April 1933 when the boycott of Jewish shops begun on a large scale.

This conveys tension and keeps the action on a tight rein, impressing the chronological sequence on contemporary viewers.

Monk lends further assistance by means of documentary inserts such as photos and newspaper headlines to emphasise how misled the Republicans were about Hitler and what his party stood for.

Last but not least, the director makes no attempt to adopt Feuchtwanger's style of writing, the interior monologue. Monk makes do with dialogue, thereby heightening tension and cohesion.

A fourth point, perhaps, is that whereas Feuchtwanger mainly describes the development of Gustav Oppermann from a literary man to a resistance fighter, Monk attaches equal importance to all three Oppermann brothers.

Gustav, played by Michael Degen, is the elder brother and principal of the family firm, although his chief interest is his literary studies.

Martin, played by Wolfgang Kieling, is the brother who in practice runs the firm, while Edgar, played by Peter Fritz, is a throat specialist at a Berlin hospital.

They are surrounded by a wide range of people who either prove their undoing or are themselves victims of the maelstrom.

Monk has been extremely careful in his casting of even minor parts, seeking to illuminate their characters and make them comprehensible in terms of the age in which they lived.

The result can be that one no longer understands them. A man like Vogel-sang, a Nazi teacher played by Klaus Mikoleit, would cut a ludicrous figure at school today.

Yet in those days no one laughed, except covertly, and the film sets out to explain why and to show what then happened.

What happened were things these well-meaning people of 1932 and 1933 could not even imagine, and this is a point viewers would do well to bear in mind.

Eckhard Böhm

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 29 January 1983)

Director
star at
Würzburg

It is amazing how persistent commitment have enabled the Würzburg film group to make the international film weekend event.

A loosely knit group of private individuals, the Würzburg film festival features two major international film festivals, Eric Rohmer and Bernard Lucel.

And despite a chronic shortage of funds the festival organisers have managed to present a perfect blend of cinema and communication.

Their aim is neither to present the show nor to stage an award ceremony but to stimulate debate and towards an improvement in the cinematographic culture both in Würzburg and further afield.

People enjoy themselves at the festival, as one organiser put it, they can get at the directors.

Access to directors features in the festival's programme, as in the case of the director of the film "The Silver Lining".

to his artistic and intellectual development. The director of the film "The Silver Lining" is a man who has made a political contribution to the New Wave.

Bertolucci too, in contrast to the termination conveyed by his film, put, frankly admitted to being a confused person.

The Würzburg audience has heard that this is still subject to the US and Drug Administration approval.

Doctors hope that the German device will help improve their patient's general health, which has been rather bleak, with frequent lapses of memory.

It was striking how keen the doctors were to get the directors to see the film themselves to politically and medically relevant points and messages.

There did not seem to be any spread belief in the cinema of the future, although little extra care because his mission fitted at least some of the problems shown.

It was decidedly appropriate that the Taviani brothers' "The Night of the Earth" should be shown, due to the patient's prolonged illness of a ludicrous man.

The Würzburg audience seemed to have a very limited sense of the hearted, cheerful dialectics of the events that is typical of French cinema.

As Eric Rohmer put it: "The topic does not necessarily mean it is a film." But this point seemed to be the Würzburg audience as it is a German cinema.

Take Jean-Pierre Mocky, a French independent film-maker and director of his trade who is not viewed as a major director either in France or Germany.

Yet films of his such as "The Trap" and "Is There A Frenchman in Space?" demonstrated the funny way in which cinema can be made.

In his fantasy film "Lien", a mad, disorganised world, his characters take arms, as they do in other

films, against a hostile environment without losing their sense of humour. "If you don't defend yourself you're a clown," he says. He compares himself with the French satirical magazine "Le Canard Enchaîné", but admits that he is not as popular as the newspaper.

The choice of films shown in Würzburg may have been determined by coincidence and necessity, but as a mirror of everyday reality it would seem to indicate that reality is in a bad way.

There was no mention of a world in order, of fresh opportunities or of solutions. But there was a ray of hope in the way foreign film-makers dealt with reality.

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MEDICINE

Aachen congress reviews international
advances in cardiac surgery

Bleeding was triggered by the use of anti-coagulants to prevent blood clotting in the artificial tubing and the plastic heart itself.

Dr Jarvik feels this is only called for in implantations of artificial heart valves in non otherwise healthy heart and not for implantations of complete artificial hearts.

Despite these problems he said it would be wrong to wait until everything was perfect. "We must carry on and learn," he said.

The Aachen symposium indicated that current research emphasis lies on the development of much more simple auxiliary pumps intended to relieve the heart ventricles for a few days or weeks at a time to give the organ a chance to recover following serious surgery or illness.

Research on such "piggyback hearts" is now in progress, particularly in the United States and Japan.

In the Federal Republic of Germany animal experiments have progressed well, especially in Aachen and Berlin, though the devices have not yet been used on people.

The Salt Lake City research team, headed by Professor W. Kolff, has long rejected the piggyback heart in favour of a complete artificial heart.

Dr Jarvik conceded in Aachen that this was a mistake. He said that the piggyback heart (the development of which has been heavily promoted in the USA in the past ten years) offers considerable advantages in cases of temporary disorders.

He also suggested that this partial device was much easier to hook up. He warned, however, that this should not lead to unnecessarily implanting these devices in patients who actually need a complete new heart.

He said such a course of action could weaken the patient to the point where even a complete artificial heart would no longer save him.

He suggested that one of the reasons why some surgeons prefer the piggyback device is that this eases their conscience because it relieves them of the necessity to remove the natural heart.

If they find that the piggyback device doesn't help, they can say that that's the luck of the game and switch it off.

But Dr Jarvik stressed that the fundamental problems involved in removing the natural heart must be faced rather than shirked.

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Take, alongside the French and Italian, Lindsay Anderson's sparkling, caustic satire, "Britannia Hospital", a film radical in its wit and cutting edge that takes a disrespectful view of everyday red tape and jobs for the boys.

The only realistic review of the present was arguably Franz Novotny's sociological look at the world of crime, "Die Ausgesessenen" (The Outsiders).

The predominant genres were satire and fairy tale, poetry and coarse humour. Why not, indeed? Are not a gentle smile and a sarcastic grin just as important as an inclusive view?

Ulrich Meyer

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 4 February 1983)

But neither this nor medication can be successful in all cases. This is when auxiliary pumps can prove to be lifesavers. They provide the heart with relief and enable it to recover.

It appears that the self-healing capability of the heart muscle has been underestimated. As with other organs, the heart muscle can sustain tissue damage such as oedemas that clear up themselves given time.

In the end, the heart muscle can even manage to restore tissue wasted away during the illness, but this process takes days rather than hours.

Professor Pierce of Pennsylvania University in Hershey read a most remarkable paper at the Aachen symposium.

Over the past four years he has treated 14 patients with an auxiliary heart with an integrated, implanted power unit. Seven survived and made a good recovery, compared with earlier experiments where the success rate was nine per cent.

The results show that what matters is to implant the auxiliary heart in good time. Most patients do not die of heart failure but of complications, primarily haemorrhaging due to the surgery itself or excessively intensive therapy measures.

Japan also has experience with auxiliary hearts. Professor Atsumi of Tokyo University, working in close cooperation with industry, has developed a piggyback heart that is likely to be marketed soon.

Impressive perfection

The participants in the Aachen symposium were impressed by the perfection of the Japanese system, which seems to be fully developed.

Should it prove its worth in clinical use, other models will find it hard to catch up with the Japanese.

The piggyback heart has a future due to its versatility. It is suitable not only for heart damage due to surgery but also as a relief for the heart following acute disorders, especially infarction.

The piggyback heart can also give surgeons the necessary time they need to find a suitable heart donor for a transplant.

Experts are generally optimistic regarding the prospects of the piggyback heart.

At the moment not more than 1,000 such devices are expected to be used in the USA and Japan following heart surgery. But testing of the devices must first be completed.

This and the further development of the artificial heart will depend on the US supervisory organisations for such experiments.

Professor B. J. Messmer, a heart surgeon who chaired the symposium, could well prove right. He suggested that first unfavourable impressions at the beginning of a new development are frequently proved wrong.

But this refers only to the technical problems, not the moral issues involved. Professor Messmer said that the fact that nobody at the Aachen symposium denied the great success of the Salt Lake City experiment could well be because surgeons who opposed it did not attend in the first place.

Rainer Föhl

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 7 February 1983)

